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 Past research has examined the many ways individuals behave in response to 
unconscious primes. For instance, unconsciously activating stereotypes leads people to 
exhibit behavior that parallels the target stereotype (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; 
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998). Priming methodology has also been extended to 
inducing mortality salience, such that specific behaviors emerge in response to thinking 
about one’s own death. Two theories, socioemotional selectivity theory and terror 
management theory, hypothesize how individuals cope with thoughts about the end of 
life. The present study attempted to extend past research by comparing older and younger 
adults’ responses to unconscious mortality salience.  
Fifty-nine younger adults and 52 older adults were randomly assigned to one of 
two prime conditions: death prime or negative prime. The unconscious primes were 
administered through word searches, which contained 20 target words related to each 
prime. Defenses to the primes were assessed via suitability ratings and reaction times to a 
picture-caption task, which contained both neutral and emotional (positive and negative) 
captions paired with neutral pictures. A defense was operationalized as higher suitability 
ratings and faster reaction times to the positive captions, as well as lower suitability 
ratings and slower reaction times to the negative captions. Based on terror management 
theory, it was expected that individuals who were primed with death would display 
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specific defensive behavioral responses as compared to those who were primed with 
negativity, regardless of age. Socioemotional selectivity theory, however, predicts that 
these defenses may also emerge when older adults are primed with negativity due to the 
increased tendency for older adults, relative to younger adults, to automatically 
implement default emotion regulatory goals. 
Analyses revealed that both younger and older adults embraced the neutral and 
positive captions after being primed with death. Participants primed with negativity were 
also more likely to embrace positivity. Age differences emerged such that younger adults 
were faster when reacting to emotional captions in the death condition than in the 
negative condition. Conversely, older adults primed with negativity reacted faster to 
emotional captions than those primed with death. Implications for terror management 
theory and socioemotional selectivity theory are discussed. Overall, both young and older 
adults displayed defenses to prime-activated threats of death and negativity. The 
implementation of death-related defenses was stronger for younger adults than the 
implementation of negativity-related defenses, but the opposite was true for older adults.
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Introduction 
 Many studies have demonstrated that directing thought toward previously 
experienced concepts can activate mental constructs that, in turn, affect behavioral 
responses. Previous research has examined both conscious and unconscious methods for 
demonstrating this phenomenon (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; 
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). One unconscious 
method, priming, has been used to activate stereotypes and character traits. The current 
study utilized priming in order to unconsciously induce mortality salience. These 
inductions drive individuals to think about death. Much past research has relied on 
conscious mortality salience inductions (e.g., DeWall & Baumeister, 2007; Maxfield et 
al., 2007) in which participants were explicitly asked to think about their own death. 
 However, the implications for unconsciously activating thoughts about death have 
yet to be thoroughly examined. Much of the existing priming literature also focuses 
solely on examining how priming impacts the behavior of younger adults (i.e., college 
students). There exists a gap in the literature when it comes to considering how these 
methods might impact the behavior of older adults. In light of this oversight, the current 
study attempted to extend past findings by applying priming techniques to older samples, 
for whom death is logically a more immediate concern. This study compared younger and 
older adults’ reactivity to unconscious death primes as well as the defense mechanisms 
that members of each age group might spontaneously adopt to suppress thoughts of death. 
Age Differences in Emotional Goals 
 Many aspects of the human experience change as people get older. This is 
especially evident when investigating differences in social goals between younger and 
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older adults. For instance, socioemotional selectivity theory posits that future time 
perspective shifts across the lifespan such that older adults perceive that they have less 
time left in their life than do younger adults. This shift in future time perspective leads to 
a shift in goal pursuit (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). By default, younger 
adults see their time as more expansive, and therefore seek goals that enhance novelty 
and build knowledge. On the other hand, older adults perceive their time as being limited 
and thus prioritize the pursuance of goals that enhance their odds of having positive 
emotionally meaningful experiences, such as spending more time with loved ones 
(Carstensen, 2006).  
 Although the aforementioned goals are the typical or “default” motivators for 
each age group, environmental factors may alter one’s goals, regardless of age. For 
instance, if younger adults view a certain facet of their time as being limited (i.e., 
upcoming graduation or relocation away from a familiar social group), they tend to 
behave in a way that is more typical of older adults (Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990). 
Essentially, they may begin to feel more motivated to spend time with old friends and 
loved ones rather than to seek out new acquaintances and expand their group of friends. 
In addition, an older adult who views his or her time as being more expansive tends to act 
more like a typical younger adult in terms of goal pursuance. Instead of aiming to spend 
more time with their close friends and family, they seek out opportunities to learn, 
expand their horizons, and experience new things. Therefore, regardless of age, the types 
of social goals pursued may depend on a person’s future time perspective (Carstensen, 
2006). In sum, socioemotional selectivity theory posits that older adults tend to naturally 
pursue goals tied to regulating emotion and carefully managing one’s time and relations 
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given their nearness to death (Lang & Carstensen, 2002). Under normal circumstances, 
younger adults do not experience this limited time pressure and do not have the same 
intense focus to regulate their exposure to negativity. In fact, seeking novelty and 
building new relationships require one to be willing to experience some negativity if a 
positive outcome does not emerge. Older adults are certainly less willing to accept this 
risk.  
Terror Management Theory 
 In addition to socioemotional selectivity theory, terror management theory also 
offers predictions as to how limits on perceived future time drive behavior. According to 
this theory, reminders of death present a threat to one’s psychological well-being. In the 
face of this threat, individuals unconsciously form defenses in order to avert potential 
terror. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999) outlined a dual-process model of 
defense against the threat of death. First, a proximal defense develops immediately after 
one experiences a conscious threat of death. This early form of defense acts to remove the 
negative thoughts about death that spontaneously emerge during the threat from one’s 
consciousness. The proximal defense allows one’s consciousness to deny the threat of 
death by using a variety of strategies, such as suppressing thoughts of death from 
consciousness or distracting oneself from potential terror. After a delay, a later, distal 
defense forms. This second line of defense attempts to increase positive thoughts by 
placing the individual in a meaningful “death-transcending reality.” Ultimately death 
cannot be completely denied; therefore, this defense works to emphasize an individual’s 
self esteem and focuses on increasing faith in one’s worldview (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). 
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 Terror management theory further posits that the reaction to death-related stimuli 
is unique when compared to reactions to other negative constructs. For instance, induced 
mortality salience leads to an increase in worldview defense (e.g., American participants 
primed with mortality salience displaying a stronger preference than control participants 
for pro-American authors). However, priming other negative mental states, such as pain 
or public speaking, fails to produce the same results, suggesting that mortality salience 
leads to a display of defensive behaviors that is specific to coping with the threat of death 
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994). Additionally, it has also 
been shown that mortality salience leads individuals to automatically tune their thoughts 
toward positive emotional information. Participants who were primed with death 
completed word stems with more positive words than did participants who were primed 
with dental pain (DeWall & Baumeister, 2007). This provides further evidence that 
individuals defend against thoughts about their own death in a variety of ways and that 
these defenses may not be identical to those used when merely coping with negativity in 
one’s life.  
 Both socioemotional selectivity theory and terror management theory attempt to 
explain how individuals respond to reminders of their own mortality. Although 
socioemotional selectivity theory predicts that younger and older adults will behave 
according to their age-appropriate future time perspective (i.e., time restricted for older 
adults but not for younger adults), terror management theory does not include an age 
qualification. According to terror management theory, both conscious and unconscious 
reminders of death result in specific exhibitions of psychological defense. More 
specifically, younger adults, as well as older adults, should attempt to reduce their 
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thoughts of death and increase positive thoughts when reminded of their own mortality 
either consciously or subconsciously. Past research has not shown, however, if older 
adults exhibit stronger defenses than do younger adults to death-related stimuli. 
 Mortality may naturally be more salient to older adults than younger adults 
because they have less time left in life. Therefore, older adults may be more predisposed 
to thinking about death. In fact, numerous studies have demonstrated evidence that older 
adults’ limited perception of the time that they have left in life serves as a strong 
motivating factor in social cognition (for review, Carstensen, 2006; McAdams, de St. 
Aubin, & Logan, 1993). As a result, death primes may elicit immediate defenses from 
older adults that are stronger than those of younger adults, leading older adults to be more 
deliberative when exposed to death-related cues in their environment. 
 On the other hand, the death prime may pose less of a threat to older adults than to 
younger adults because older adults may be more accustomed to thinking about death. In 
this case, younger adults may exhibit stronger proximal and distal defenses after being 
primed with death.  Additionally, although prior research suggests that younger adults 
display defenses against threats of death but not against negativity primes, older adults 
may be more likely to implement psychic defenses against negativity than against death. 
This possibility is consistent with research demonstrating that older adults are more 
effective at selecting and implementing emotion regulation strategies than young adults 
when faced with uncontrollable negative outcomes in their lives (Blanchard-Fields, 
2007). The current study sought to identify differences in the automatic defenses younger 
and older adults develop in response to unconscious death threats. 
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Implicit Goal Activation 
 Goal pursuit has typically been considered to be a largely conscious process. For 
example, a series of studies demonstrated that when individuals consciously formed goal 
implementation intentions (e.g., stipulate specifically when and how they will pursue a 
goal), they were more likely than those who did not form goal implementation intentions 
to complete their goal (Gollwitzer & Brandstatter, 1997). Essentially, the conscious 
intention to engage in goal-directed behavior was linked to specific opportunities that 
promoted goal pursuit. It has also been shown that the way participants conceptualize 
their goals can affect intrinsic motivation to complete those goals. Participants who were 
told to avoid failure (rather than to approach success) demonstrated decreased intrinsic 
motivation to complete word puzzles (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996). It is clear from these 
findings that goal-directed behavior can be explicitly and consciously manipulated. 
  However, recent research has demonstrated that individuals can engage in goal-
directed behavior without conscious awareness. For instance, it was shown that 
individuals who were unconsciously primed with a friend-related theme displayed more 
helpful behaviors than individuals who were primed with a co-worker-related theme 
(Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). These two unconscious relationship primes created differing 
subconscious representations of the participants’ relationships and differentially guided 
the participants’ motivation to help via unconscious schema activation. In another study, 
participants who were unconsciously primed with stereotypes of the elderly later walked 
more slowly down a hallway than did control participants (Bargh et al., 1996). In this 
case, unconsciously thinking about elderly stereotypes led participants to behave in a 
manner consistent with the activated stereotypes. These studies along with others point to 
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the fact that goal-states and motivation can be unconsciously primed (Dijksterhuis & 
Aarts, 2010). Additionally, the unconscious activation of goals may lead individuals to 
act without conscious choice or awareness. 
 Past research has chronicled the many ways in which implicit goals have been 
measured. In general, investigators implement some behavioral task related to the prime 
in order to measure the strength of the implicit goal. For instance, after priming 
achievement goals, researchers typically compare the performance of experimental 
participants to that of control participants on a cognitive task, such as the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task (e.g., Hassin, Bargh, Zimerman, 2009) or a series of word-search tasks (e.g., 
Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndoller, & Trotschel, 2001). Implicit interpersonal goals 
have been measured by priming participants with various thoughts about social 
relationships (e.g., friends or co-workers) and then assessing the participants’ willingness 
to help the experimenter with a subsequent study (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003). It is 
apparent from these studies that implicit goal activation leads to goal-directed behavioral 
effects on subsequent related tasks. 
Priming Mortality Salience 
  In the past, mortality salience researchers have largely used explicit methods for 
priming thoughts of death. The most commonly implemented method to induce thoughts 
of death is to directly ask participants to think about their own death and to write about 
how these thoughts make them feel. Researchers in this area also typically ask 
participants to write about what they think will happen to them when they die (e.g., 
DeWall & Baumeister, 2007; Greenberg et al., 1994; Maxfield et al., 2007). By using this 
method, participants are consciously aware that they are thinking about their own death.  
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Research on the implicit and unconscious priming of death has been utilized, but is not 
the typical method for inducing mortality salience. For instance, participants exposed to 
subliminal masked presentations of the word “dead” exhibited an increased worldview 
defense compared to participants exposed to masked presentations of the word “pain” 
(Arndt, Allen, & Greenberg, 2001). This study indicates that the effects of thinking about 
one’s own mortality are evident even without participants’ conscious awareness of the 
mortality salience induction.  
 In another study, researchers investigated the effect that subliminal mortality 
salience has on visual attention toward different types of images. When compared with 
control participants, those who were subliminally primed with death spent significantly 
less time looking at images of physical injury. In addition, those in the death condition 
spent more time looking at threatening images (Hirschberger, Ein-Dor, Arzouan, & 
Zivotofsky, 2010). This finding demonstrates that subliminal death primes lead 
participants to exhibit distinguishable behaviors that indicate a defense against death-
thought accessibility.  Also, it is important to note that, in these two studies, the authors 
did not attempt to distinguish between proximal and distal types of defense. Furthermore, 
the priming used in these studies took place on a trial-by-trial basis suggesting that (a) 
defense from subliminal threats of death may take place immediately after the 
presentation of a prime and continue to be re-implemented with each additional stimulus, 
and (b) averaging responses across trials did not eliminate their ability to track noticeable 
differences in their participants’ defensive behaviors during the priming tasks.  
 The current study attempted to bridge a gap in the field by implicitly activating 
mortality salience in an older adult sample. Although researchers have used explicit 
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methods to induce mortality salience in older adults (e.g., Maxfield et al., 2007), the 
unconscious induction of mortality salience has not been utilized. Word searches have 
been used in other types of research to unconsciously prime concepts. For instance, 
Hassin and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that individuals who were unconsciously 
primed by completing word searches that contained words related to achievement 
displayed higher performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. Participants were 
unaware of any link between the priming task and the subsequent behavioral task. 
Furthermore, participants’ thoughts of high performance remained outside of their 
consciousness during the priming task. This finding suggests that unconscious priming of 
a construct impacts observable behavior.  
In the present study, word searches that contain target words related to death were 
used to lead younger and older participants to unconsciously think about their own 
mortality. By including older adults in this research, a more complete understanding of 
implicit goal priming was sought. The behavioral implications resulting from the 
unconscious word search priming techniques were assessed using a picture-caption task 
in which participants were instructed to rate the extent to which they thought the picture-
caption pairings matched (i.e., suitability rating). Some of the captions offered emotional 
(positive/negative) interpretations of the pictures. A defense to death thoughts was 
indicated when participants expressed a higher suitability rating for positive captions and 
lower suitability ratings for negative captions. In addition, participants’ reaction times to 
the picture-caption task served as an indicator of how much time was invested when 
processing the caption (Bassili, 1993). If experiencing threat and attempting to form a 
defense to that threat, an individual may require more time than when not experiencing 
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threat to evaluate a caption’s relevance to a picture stimulus. Therefore, faster reaction 
times indicated a faster implementation of the defense. In sum, participants’ defenses to 
the mortality salience induction manifested themselves in participants’ responses to the 
captions as well as their reaction times in the picture-caption task. Furthermore, this 
manifestation of goal-directed behavior remained unconscious throughout the entire 
experiment (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Hassin et al., 2009). 
 Taking into account previous research supporting terror management theory, it 
was hypothesized that both younger and older adults would defend against thoughts of 
death following an unconscious mortality salience induction. Defensive behaviors were 
operationalized relative to the picture-caption task and will be elaborated upon in the 
method section that follows. Additionally, given the robust support found for 
socioemotional selectivity theory, it was also hypothesized that older adults’ default focus 
on emotion regulation would yield age differences when participants were primed with 
negative information not related to death, such that only older adults would exhibit a 
defense against negative thoughts. The manipulation used in this study to prime 
participants did not ask them to consciously reflect on death or on a negative experience 
that they have had in the past. Rather, the manipulation capitalized on a nonconscious 
priming technique that has worked in the past to activate goals (e.g., Hassin et al., 2009). 
Given this, it is difficult to draw a direct parallel between the proximal and distal defense 
mechanisms used by participants in the current studies and those operating in prior work.  
In the current study and consistent with the findings from the subliminal priming 
studies discussed earlier, participants were expected to engage in defense tactics 
immediately after the prime manipulation. However, given that other studies that have 
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found a proximal defense to mortality salience included a time delay between the prime 
and the measurement of the resulting changes in behavior, it was not entirely clear a 
priori if the participants’ defenses would be activated early on after the prime or require a 
brief period of time before emerging. Exploratory analyses were used to determine the 
extent to which young and older adults implemented proximal and distal defenses to each 
priming condition in the manipulation by examining the early and late halves of the 
defense measure that participants completed immediately after the priming manipulation.  
Method 
This study employed a 2 (Age Group: younger and older adults) × 2 (Condition: 
death prime and negative prime) between-subjects design. The main dependent variable 
that was considered was the process by which participants provided judgments in the 
picture-caption task after being primed. Both the suitability ratings and the time that it 
took to provide these ratings in the picture-caption task were examined. Additionally, 
temporal sequence was added as an exploratory within-subjects factor to determine if the 
participants’ responses in the picture caption task (i.e., reaction time and ratings) varied 
as a function of the time that had elapsed since the end of the priming task. Specifically, 
participants’ performance during the early and late trials of the task were examined to 
determine if the timing of the trials impacted the choices made by participants or the time 
that it took for them to respond. 
Participants 
Fifty-nine younger adults (29 female, 30 male), ranging in age from 18 to 32 (M = 
19.51, SD = 2.02), were recruited from introductory level psychology courses in 
exchange for course credit. The 52 older adults (27 female, 25 male), ranging in age from 
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63 to 80 (M = 67.92, SD = 4.09), were recruited from the community through mail-out 
invitations and phone calls encouraging participation. 
Materials 
Word searches. Older and younger participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions: death prime or negative prime. Word searches were used to 
unconsciously prime the different conditions. The two priming word searches were 
created by generating 20 words related to death and 20 negative words not related to 
death. The Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999), a 
collection of words rated on their pleasure, was used to generate negative words. Word 
searches have been used in previous research to unconsciously manipulate goals (Hassin 
et al., 2009). Participants in the death condition were asked to find words in a word 
search that contained 20 words related to death (e.g., ashes, burial, cemetery; see 
Appendix A). Participants in the negative condition were asked to find words in a word 
search that contained 20 negative words not related to death (e.g., agony, betray, corrupt; 
see Appendix B). All participants completed a neutral word search containing words 
related to birds (see Appendix C) before beginning the word search for their assigned 
experimental condition. Participants were scored on the number of words out of 20 that 
they found within a five minute period for each word search as a gauge of individual 
differences in how invested participants were in the task. 
Picture-caption task. In order to assess the effects of the word search primes, a 
picture-caption task was presented to participants. More specifically, this task contained 
24 neutral photographs paired with captions from 3 different categories: positive, 
negative, and neutral. Overall, there were 6 picture-caption pairings for the positive and 
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negative categories (or 12 emotional picture-caption pairings) and 12 pictures for the 
neutral category. The 24 neutral photographs were chosen from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and Google Images. 
The IAPS is a collection of photographs from a variety of semantic categories that are 
rated in terms of their emotional nature. Photographs were also chosen from Google 
Images based on their similarity in appearance to the neutral IAPS photographs as well as 
their non-emotional nature. 
Each photograph/caption pairing was presented on a computer screen with one 
photograph/caption appearing at a time. Participants were instructed to indicate the extent 
to which they thought that the caption matched the photo provided, or how well the photo 
and caption matched. Responses ranged from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 
(completely). A manipulation check was performed at the end of the experiment to ensure 
that the participants perceived the captions as falling into the three intended categories – 
positive, neutral, and negative. The outcome of this manipulation check is discussed in 
the results section. 
PANAS. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988; see Appendix D) is a commonly used mood assessment tool. It consists 
of 10 adjectives that assess one’s positive mood (interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, 
proud, alert, inspired, determined, attentive, and active) and 10 that assess negative mood 
(distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, and afraid). 
In the current study, ten words were added to the positive affect (5) and negative affect 
(5) components of the PANAS. Watson and colleagues (1988) report internal 
consistencies of .89 for momentary positive affect and .85 for momentary negative affect, 
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and the current study found internal consistencies of .88 for momentary positive affect 
and .85 for momentary negative affect.  Participants completed the schedule with respect 
to how they currently felt by indicating the extent to which they are experiencing the 
feelings represented by each adjective using a 1 to 5 Likert scale rating (1 = very slightly 
or not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = quite a bit, and 5 = extremely). This 
questionnaire was used in this study to evaluate participants’ positive and negative affect 
after completing the picture-caption task. The PANAS has been used in other mortality 
salience priming studies to assess mood (i.e., DeWall & Baumeister, 2007).  
Life Orientation Test. The Life Orientation Test Revised (Scheier, Carver, & 
Bridges, 1994; see Appendix E) was used to assess participants’ optimism and 
pessimism. This scale consists of 10 items - four of which are filler items and six of 
which capture optimism and pessimism. The scale itself can be separated into three 
optimistic items (Cronbach’s alpha = .66) and three pessimistic items (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .76), or the pessimistic items can be reverse scored and added to the optimistic items to 
create an overall optimism score (Cronbach’s alpha = .79; Scheier et al., 1994). In the 
current study, optimism and pessimism were assessed separately, and had internal 
consistencies of.68 and .75, respectively. The optimistic items include: “In uncertain 
times, I usually expect the best”, “I’m always optimistic about my future”, and “Overall, I 
expect more good things to happen to me than bad”. The pessimistic items include: “If 
something can go wrong for me, it will”, “I hardly ever expect things to go my way”, and 
“I rarely count on good things happening to me”. Participants responded to each item 
using 0 to 4 Likert rating scale to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each 
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statement, where 0 = I strongly disagree, 1 = I disagree, 2 = I neither agree nor disagree, 
3 = I agree, and 4 = I strongly agree.  
Time Scale (a.k.a. Future Time Perspective Scale). The Time Scale (Lang & 
Carstensen, 2002; see Appendix F) is a 10-item scale that assesses how much time a 
person feels that they have left in life. Participants used a 1 to 7 Likert rating scale to 
indicate the extent to which they agree with each statement (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree). Sample statements include: “There is plenty of time left in my life to 
make new plans”, “My future is filled with possibilities”, and “My future seems infinite to 
me”. Past research (Lang & Carstensen, 2002) has demonstrated that this measure has 
excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .92), and a similar high level of 
internal consistency was found in the current study (Cronbach’s alpha = .89). 
 Advanced Vocabulary Test. The Advanced Vocabulary Test is an 18-item 
abbreviated measure of verbal ability from the Kit of Factor Referenced Tests (Ekstrom, 
French, Harman, & Derman, 1976; see Appendix G). Participants have four minutes to 
identify which one word for each item is most similar in meaning to a target word. 
Letter Sets Test. The Letter Sets Test is a 15-item abbreviated measure of 
inductive reasoning ability from the Kit of Factor Referenced Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976; 
see Appendix H). Within each item, participants were presented with five sets of letters 
with four letters in each set. Four of the sets of letters are alike in some way, and the 
participant must identify the pattern that holds four of the five sets together so that they 
can eliminate the odd set of letters. Participants have seven minutes to complete the test. 
Religiosity Scale. The Religiosity Scale (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975; see 
Appendix I) is a 9-item multiple choice measure to assess various aspects of religious 
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involvement, such as ritual religiosity, consequential religiosity, ideological religiosity, 
and experiential religiosity. Sample items include: “How often have you attended 
religious services in the past year?”, “When you have a serious personal problem how 
often do you take religious advice or teaching into consideration?”, and “How much of 
an influence would you say that religion has on the way that you choose to act and the 
way you choose to spend your time each day?”. Research (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975) 
has shown that this measure has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha >.90) and a 
similar high level of internal consistency was found in this study (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.93). 
Trail Making Test. The Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1955; see Appendix J) is a 
cognitive measure of task switching ability and visual attention. It consists of two 
versions. Version A contains 25 numbered circles (1 through 25) and requires 
participants to sequentially connect the circles as fast and accurately as possible. Version 
B contains 13 numbered circles (1 through 13) and 12 lettered circles (A through L). 
Participants are instructed to connect the circles by alternating between numbers and 
letters in a sequential order. Participants were timed for both versions of the tests. The 
difference in time it takes a participant to successfully complete version A and version B 
is taken as an indicator of the participant’s ability to switch tasks. 
Procedure 
First, participants were greeted and directed to an individual testing room within 
the laboratory. Participants were given an informed consent form (see Appendix K) that 
outlined basic information regarding the study and was approved by Western Kentucky 
University’s Human Subjects Review Board (HSRB; HS10-168). After signing the 
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consent form, the experimenter briefly explained the purpose of the study: to examine 
some everyday thought processes of people. The study was presented as a series of 
unrelated cognitive or everyday tasks. 
The first group of cognitive tasks consisted of the Advanced Vocabulary Test and 
the Letter Sets Test. After completing these two tests, participants were presented with 
the word searches. Prior to completing the manipulation word searches, all participants 
completed a neutral word search that contained 20 words related to birds. After 
completing this word search, participants were randomly assigned to the manipulation 
condition (death prime or negative prime condition). All word searches had a five-minute 
time limit, ensuring that participants did not find all the words. This was intended to 
enhance participants’ perception that the goal to complete the word search was 
unaccomplished, thereby increasing goal adherence (Koo & Fishbach, 2008). 
After the word search tasks, the experimenter opened the file containing the 
picture-caption task on the computer. These instructions for the task appeared on the 
screen for participants to read: 
For this portion of the session, you are going to be presented with some 
photographs. Last year, participants were asked to write down one 
possible interpretation of the contents of each of 300 photographs.  
 
Today, you will see 24 of these photographs. The photographs will be 
randomly chosen from the 300 that are available. For each photo, please 
indicate to what extent each caption fits the photo provided, or how well 
the photo and caption match.  
 
When making your judgment, please use the 1 to 5 rating scale that is 
available to you at the bottom of the screen.  Please indicate your 
responses using the number buttons on the keyboard. 
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Participants then completed a series of questionnaires containing the PANAS, the 
Life Orientation Test, the Time Scale, the Religiosity Scale and a demographics 
questionnaire (see Appendix L). Finally, the Trail Making Test was administered and 
afterwards participants completed a manipulation check on the computer in which they 
rated the pleasantness and unpleasantness of the pictures and captions used earlier. The 
experimenter then fully debriefed participants. After completing all tasks, participants 
were thanked and dismissed. 
Hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that defenses would be exhibited through (a) the way 
participants responded via their suitability ratings in the picture-caption task and (b) the 
amount of time it took participants to provide their rating for each picture and caption 
pairing in the picture-caption task. More specifically, a defense to a prime would be 
indicated when participants provided higher suitability ratings to positive captions 
(positive tuning, or embracing/approaching positivity) and provided lower suitability 
ratings to the negative captions (avoiding or rejecting negativity). In terms of reaction 
times, a defense to a prime would be indicated when participants respond quicker to 
positive captions (automatic positive tuning, or embracing positivity) and slower to 
negative captions (indicative of an uncertain decision). Taken together, both the 
suitability ratings and response times indicated whether or not a defense was exhibited 
for each condition. 
Based on terror management theory, it was hypothesized that both younger and 
older adults in the death prime condition would unconsciously defend against thoughts of 
death. Therefore, both younger and older adults in the death prime condition should 
19 
 
provide higher suitability ratings and display quicker reaction times for the positive 
captions in the picture-caption task relative to neutral. Further evidence of a defense 
should be exhibited through lower suitability ratings and longer reaction times for 
negative captions relative to neutral. 
For older adults in the negative prime condition, a similar defensive posture was 
hypothesized for stimuli encountered in the picture-caption task. Older adults, who are 
more adept at regulating their emotions (Blanchard-Fields, 2007), should rate positive 
captions as being more suitable while displaying shorter reaction times for positive 
captions relative to neutral. This defense should also be evidenced by older adults’ lower 
suitability ratings and longer reaction times for negative captions relative to neutral. On 
the other hand, younger adults in the negative prime condition were hypothesized to 
display a pattern of embracing negativity. That is, younger adults were expected to rate 
negative captions as being more suitable than neutral captions and were expected to 
require less time to respond to negative captions than to neutral captions. 
Results 
 Before examining the impact of the primes on dependent variables, analyses were 
conducted to ensure that the stimuli used in the picture-caption task were correctly 
categorized as neutral, positive, or negative.  Next, age differences were examined in 
regards to the cognitive and personality measures. Overall analyses were then conducted 
to investigate how each priming manipulation impacted participants’ suitability ratings as 
well as response times to the picture-caption task. Exploratory analyses were then 
conducted to examine differences between responses and reaction times both early and 
late in the picture-caption task. Finally, exploratory correlational analyses were 
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conducted to investigate whether the strength of the prime affected participants’ 
responses on other dependent measures. 
Picture Caption Task 
The picture-caption task consisted of 24 trials in which the participant indicated 
the extent to which a given caption matched a picture that appeared above it. Half of the 
trials included neutral captions and half included emotional caption (6 positive and 6 
negative). Response times for the trials were examined for outliers. Trials were omitted 
from analyses if they represented response times that exceeded 2.5 times the standard 
deviation of the participant’s overall mean reaction time. In total, 56 trials were dropped 
of the 2,610 trials, or 2.15% of all trials for all participants. 
Picture-Caption Task Manipulation Check. To ensure that the pictures used in 
the picture-caption task were correctly categorized as being neutral and to ensure that the 
captions were correctly categorized into negative, neutral, and positive categories, 
participants were asked to rate how pleasant and unpleasant they thought the pictures and 
captions were. Ratings ranged from 1 (not at all pleasant/unpleasant) to 5 (extremely 
pleasant/unpleasant). A repeated measures ANOVA yielded a main effect of caption type 
for pleasant ratings, F (2, 220) = 454.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .81. Paired samples t-tests 
showed that participants considered the positive captions to be significantly more 
pleasant than the neutral captions, t (110) = 13.80, p < .001, and considered neutral 
captions to be significantly more pleasant than negative captions, t (110) = 17.97, p < 
.001. Positive captions were also rated significantly more pleasant than negative captions, 
t (110) = 27.39, p < .001. For unpleasant ratings, a repeated measures ANOVA also 
yielded a main effect of caption type, F (2, 220) = 629.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .85. Paired 
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samples t-tests showed that the negative captions were considered significantly more 
unpleasant than were the neutral captions, t (110) = 27.28, p < .001, and the neutral 
captions were considered more unpleasant than were the positive captions, t (110) = 5.38, 
p < .001. In addition, the negative captions were rated as significantly more unpleasant 
than were the positive captions, t (110) = 26.96, p < .001. 
Overall, participants rated the positive captions as mostly pleasant (M = 3.75, SD 
= .73) and not at all unpleasant (M = 1.30, SD = .51). The negative captions were rated as 
mostly unpleasant (M = 3.88, SD =.75) and not at all pleasant (M = 1.38, SD = .56). 
Participants rated the neutral captions as somewhat pleasant (M = 2.71, SD = .71) and 
slightly unpleasant (M = 1.59, SD = .59). Participants rated the neutral pictures used in 
the picture-caption task as slightly pleasant (M = 2.38, SD = .56) and slightly unpleasant 
(M = 2.05, SD = .58) (See Appendix M). 
Age Differences in Personality and Cognitive Measures 
 Independent samples t-tests were conducted to investigate whether age 
differences existed for the various cognitive and personality measures that were 
administered to participants. Younger adults (Letter Sets: M = 10.15, SD = 2.97; Trails 
Making: M = 33.92 sec, SD = 21.18) significantly outperformed older adults (Letter Sets: 
M = 8.02, SD = 3.29; Trails Making: M = 63.37, SD = 41.18) on both the Letter Sets Test, 
t (108) = 3.57, p = .001, as well as the Trail Making Test, t (108) = 4.81, p < .001. This 
finding indicated that the younger adult sample was more adept at problem solving, 
pattern finding, and task switching than were older adults. However, older adults (M = 
9.23, SD = 3.25) significantly outperformed younger adults (M = 7.24, SD = 2.32) on the 
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Vocabulary Test, t (109) = 3.75, p < .001, indicating the typical pattern that older adults 
generally have more acquired knowledge than do younger adults. 
 Younger adults (M = 5.67, SD = .84) reported higher levels of future time 
perspective than did older adults (M = 4.35, SD = 1.10), t (109) = 3.75, p <.001. This 
finding was not surprising, as older adults are naturally closer to the end of their life than 
are younger adults. Younger adults (Pessimism: M = 1.76, SD = .72; Negative Affect: M 
= 1.59, SD = .49) also reported higher levels of both pessimism, t (107) = 4.25, p < .001, 
and negative affect, t (109) = 3.88, p < .001, than did older adults (Pessimism: M = 1.18, 
SD = .69; Negative Affect: M = 1.28, SD = .32). Older adults (Optimism: M = 2.90, SD = 
.57; Positive Affect: M = 3.58, SD = .69) reported higher levels of both optimism, t (106) 
= 2.08, p = .04, and positive affect, t (109) = 4.61, p < .001, than did younger adults 
(Optimism: M = 2.64, SD = .71; Positive Affect: M = 3.03, SD = .57). Taken together, 
these findings indicate that older adults were generally more positive than were younger 
adults. Older adults (M = 3.99, SD = 1.04) also reported marginally higher levels of 
religiosity than did younger adults (M = 3.63, SD = .99), t (105) = 1.86, p = .07. Means 
for the cognitive and personality measures are depicted in Appendix N. 
Suitability Ratings 
A 2 (Condition: death or negative prime) × 2 (Age: younger or older) × 3 
(Caption Type: negative, neutral, and positive) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on 
participant suitability ratings in order to determine whether participants exhibited 
defenses to the different primes. Overall, there was a significant main effect of caption 
type, F (2, 214) = 11.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, such that participants provided higher 
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suitability ratings for neutral captions (M = 3.27, SE = .07) and positive captions (M = 
3.28, SE = .08) than for negative captions (M = 3.03, SE = .08).  
A marginal interaction of Caption Type × Condition was also found, F (2, 214) = 
2.09, p = .13, ηp2 = .02. To explore this marginal interaction, separate paired-samples t-
tests were conducted to compare the responses to the different captions types for each 
condition (refer to Figure 1 and Appendix O for depictions of these means). Participants 
in the death prime condition rated neutral captions as being significantly more suitable 
than the negative captions, t (53) = 3.87, p < .001. In addition, positive captions were 
rated as significantly more suitable than the negative captions, t (53) = 2.62, p = .01. The 
suitability ratings for positive captions were no different than those for neutral, t (53) = 
1.35, p = .18. Participants in the negative prime condition provided significantly higher 
suitability ratings when responding to the positive captions than when responding to the 
negative captions, t (56) = 2.76, p = .01. The suitability ratings for neutral captions did 
not differ from those for negative, t (56) = 1.60, p = .12, or positive captions, t (56) = 
1.45, p = .15. 
Contrary to predictions, age did not interact with caption type and/or condition, 
suggesting that young and older adults offered similar suitability ratings for the captions 
in the picture-caption task after the priming manipulation. Overall, these analyses 
indicate that, regardless of age, participants in the death prime condition were more likely 
to embrace both neutral and positive captions than the negative captions whereas those 
primed with negativity were more likely to embrace positivity. 
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Figure 1. Participant suitability ratings for each caption type by condition. 
Reaction Times 
In order to investigate defenses in terms of reaction times, a 2 (Condition: death 
or negative prime) × 2 (Age: younger or older) × 3 (Caption type: negative, neutral, and 
positive) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the amount of time it took participants 
to respond to each stimulus in the picture-caption task. Overall, A main effect for age was 
also found, F (1, 107) = 81.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, such that older adults displayed longer 
reaction times overall (M = 11434 msec, SE = 386) than did younger adults (6644 msec, 
SE = 362). Also, a significant main effect of caption type was found, F (2, 214) = 5.11, p 
= .01, ηp2 = .05. A paired samples t-test showed that, overall, participants responded 
faster to positive captions (M = 8570 msec, SD = 3959) than to negative (M = 9116 msec, 
SD = 3929), t (110) = 2.73, p = .01, or neutral captions (M = 9006 msec, SD = 3587), t 
(110) = 2.38, p = .02. The response times to negative and neutral captions were no 
different, t (110) = .64, p = .52. 
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There was also a marginal Caption Type × Age × Condition three-way 
interaction, F (2, 214) = 2.12, p = .12, ηp2 = .02. To interpret this three-way interaction, 
three separate 2 (Condition) × 2 (Age) one-way ANOVAs were conducted; a separate 
ANOVA was conducted for each caption type. When responding to negative captions, 
there was a marginal Age × Condition interaction, F (1, 107) = 2.17, p = .14, ηp2 = .02, 
such that older adults took longer to respond in the death condition than in the negative 
condition, whereas younger adults took longer to respond in the negative condition than 
in the death condition (see Figure 2 and Appendix O for depictions of these means). 
 
Figure 2. Pariticipant reaction times to negative captions for each condition 
as a function of  age. 
For positive captions, a marginal Age × Condition interaction was observed, F (1, 
107) = 2.19, p = .14. ηp2 = .02, such that older adults took longer to respond in the death 
condition than in the negative condition, whereas younger adults took more time to 
respond in the negative condition than in the death condition (see Figure 3 and Appendix 
Condition 
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O for depictions of these means). Although not significant at α = .05, this mean trend is 
notable because it signifies a possible age difference in the nature of young and older 
adults’ defenses to unconsciously activated thoughts about death and negativity.  
 
Figure 3. Participant reaction times to positive captions for each condition as 
a function of age. 
No interactions were observed for the neutral captions (see Figure 4 and 
Appendix O). Therefore, older adults primed with death and younger adults primed with 
negativity took longer than their peers in the alternative condition to rate emotional 
captions. 
Taken together, participant suitability ratings as well as reaction times to the 
picture-caption task indicate specific effects of the unconscious death and negative 
primes. Younger adults in the death condition were more likely to reject negative 
captions and accept neutral and positive captions. At the same time, these participants 
took less time to reject negative caption than did young adults in the negative prime 
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Figure 4. Participant reaction times to neutral captions for each condition as 
a function of age. 
condition. Younger adults who were primed with negativity were more also likely to 
embrace positivity by rating positive captions as more suitable than either neutral or 
negative captions. However, younger adults took more time to rate positive captions in 
the negative condition than in the death condition. Similar to younger adults, older adults 
were also more likely to reject negative captions after being primed with death. However, 
older adults in the negative condition displayed faster reaction times to the emotional 
captions than did those in the death condition. This may suggest that older adults are less 
prone to investing resources to defend against thoughts of death than they are to regulate 
their emotions when primed with negativity. 
Early/Late Defense 
 In order to explore possible differences in defense mechanisms implemented by 
participants in response to the priming manipulation, responses and reaction times were 
both calculated for early and late segments of the picture-caption task. Separate 2 
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(Timing: early or late) × 3 (Caption Type: negative, neutral, and positive) × 2 (Age: 
younger or older) mixed model ANOVAs were conducted for each condition to 
determine if the results reported above were impacted by timing of the picture-caption 
task trials. 
Responses. No significant main effects or interactions of timing on participants’ 
responses were observed in either the death prime or negative conditions. Overall, the 
findings reported above did not differ as a function of trial timing.  
Reaction Times. For participants in the death prime condition, there was a 
significant main effect of timing, F (1, 52) = 35.75, p = .00, ηp2 = .41, such that 
participants displayed significantly faster reaction times later in the sequence of trials (M 
= 8156, SE = 358) than earlier in the sequence (M = 9953, SE = 481). Participants in the 
negative prime condition also showed significantly faster times later in the sequence of 
trials (M = 8329, SE = 368) when compared to response times from earlier half of the 
trials (M = 9757, SE = 377), F (1, 55) = 30.59, p = .00, ηp2 = .36.  
For the negative prime condition, a marginal Time × Age interaction was found, F 
(1, 55) = 3.26, p = .08, ηp2 = .06. Older adults showed a slightly larger improvement in 
response time with practice than did younger adults. Finally, a significant interaction of 
Caption Type × Time was observed in the negative prime condition, F (2, 110) = 3.12, p 
= .05, ηp2 = .05. Paired samples t-tests showed that early on, participants displayed 
significantly longer reaction times to the neutral captions (M = 10098. SD = 4009) than to 
the positive captions (M = 8879, SD = 4303), t (56) = 2.91, p = .01. Later on in the 
sequence, participants displayed longer reaction times to negative captions (M = 8537. 
SD = 3700) than to positive captions (M = 7877, SD = 3794), t (56) = 2.19, p = .03.  
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The overall main effect of timing suggested that all participants reacted faster to 
the stimuli as they progressed through the picture-caption task as a result of practice 
effects. However, for participants in the negative prime condition, older adults showed a 
larger improvement in time between early and late trials when compared to younger 
adults. This suggested that older adults might be more effective than younger adults at 
regulating their emotional responses after being primed with negativity.   
Exploratory Analyses: Potential Relationships between Performance during 
Priming Manipulation and Performance during the Picture-Caption Task  
 It was assumed that participants who found more words in the manipulation word 
searches were more invested in the task, and therefore more impacted by the prime than if 
they found fewer words. Therefore, the more words that were found for either the death 
or negative prime word searches, the stronger the effect of the prime. Overall, an 
independent samples t-test indicated that for the neutral (birds) word search that all 
participants completed, younger adults found significantly more words (M = 9.10, SD = 
2.66) than did older adults (M = 6.67, SD = 1.9), t (109) = 5.46, p < .001. This suggested 
that overall, younger adults were more successful at this type of task than were older 
adults. 
 A 2 (Age) × 2 (Condition) ANOVA for the manipulation word searches yielded a 
significant main effect of age, F (1, 107) = 45.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, such that younger 
adults found more words (M = 7.02, SE = .34) than did older adults (M = 3.65, SD = .36). 
In addition, a significant main effect of condition emerged, F (1, 107) = 26.92, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .20, such that participants in the negative condition found more words (M = 6.62, 
SE = .35) overall than did those in the death condition (M = 4.05, SE = .36). 
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 Correlations between the number of words found for the manipulation word 
searches and other measures were conducted separately for each condition and age group 
as to avoid age group and condition as confound variables. Younger participants in the 
negative prime condition who found more words in the manipulation word search were 
less likely to report negative affect (r = -.388). This suggested that the stronger the 
unconscious negative prime, younger adult participants were less likely to report 
conscious negative affect. Younger adults primed with death who found more words in 
the manipulation word search were less likely to provide high suitability ratings for 
positive captions (r = -.465). This indicated that strong unconscious death primes might 
make it less likely that younger adults would engage in positive tuning.  
Discussion 
The current study extends research in the area of mortality salience by 
investigating age differences in participants’ reactions to emotional and neutral captions 
paired with neutral pictures when unconsciously primed with death or negativity. As 
compared to previous mortality salience research, this study investigated the effects of 
more subtle primes by asking participants to complete word searches that included words 
related to death or negativity. The participants’ defenses were also operationalized in a 
way that differs from past research. Instead of asking participants to make worldview 
judgments, participants were asked to consider the appropriateness of emotional and 
neutral captions as descriptions of neutral images. In this way, defenses were captured via 
these emotion-related judgments made by participants after having been primed. More 
specifically, the participants’ responses to emotional stimuli were examined for evidence 
31 
 
of the emotion regulation processes often assumed to underlie the defense to threats of 
death proposed by terror management theorists. 
Age Differences in Response Patterns after Priming 
Based on terror management theory, it was expected that both younger and older 
adults would exhibit a defense against death primes. After being subconsciously primed 
via a word search filled with death words, both younger and older adults were expected to 
provide high suitability ratings to positive captions, while providing lower suitability 
ratings for negative captions. In addition, it was expected that both younger and older 
adults would provide faster response times to positive captions than for negative captions, 
indicating automatic positive tuning after being primed with death. Overall, these 
predictions were only partly supported. With respect to the death prime condition, 
participants appeared to approach or embrace neutral captions when paired with neutral 
images while rejecting negative captions. Participants displayed some approach-like 
behaviors toward positive captions, but less than expected given the positive tuning noted 
in prior research (DeWall & Baumeister, 2007). Interestingly, participants did appear to 
engage in a partial defense to threats of death by rejecting the negative captions that were 
paired with the neutral images. It is important to note that this interpretation is qualified 
by a difference in the timing of the younger and older adults’ responses. Specifically, 
young adults not only rejected negative captions after being primed with death, but their 
judgments were faster than when they were primed with negativity. The pattern of 
response times displayed by older adults was opposite that of young adults, with more 
time needed to reject the negative captions after being primed with death-related words 
than when primed with negative words. 
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At least two possible explanations may account for this difference. First, as noted 
in prior aging research on terror management theory, older adults may not attempt to 
defend themselves from threats of death with the same urgency as younger adults 
(Maxfield et al., 2007). Given their stage in life, older adults are believed to consider 
their limited time left in life on a daily basis. As mentioned earlier in reference to 
socioemotional selectivity theory, this limit on future time has many implications for the 
decisions that older adults make in their personal and social lives (Birditt & Fingerman, 
2005; Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Carstensen, 2006). Second, when confronted with 
emotional stimuli in their environment, older adults are just as likely as young adults to 
direct their attention to these stimuli (Mather & Knight, 2006). When primed with death-
related words, older adults’ spontaneous defenses may be working toward a different 
outcome than when they are primed with negative words. Consequently, in the death 
prime condition, older adults are acting to suppress mainly negativity, whereas, in the 
negative prime condition, older adults’ activated emotion regulatory schema may drive 
them to approach positivity. Such an approach has been called the “positivity effect” in 
the aging literature, and it has been suggested to be the default operating state of older 
adults (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). 
Just as with the death prime condition, mixed support emerged for the original 
prediction from younger and older adults’ reactions to stimuli after being primed with 
negativity. Both younger and older adults embraced positive captions after being primed 
with negativity. This finding is consistent with socioemotional selectivity theory and the 
prediction that older adults may defend against any negativity that is unconsciously 
activated through negative primes. However, this finding is not consistent with how 
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younger adults should react to negativity in their environment. When examining younger 
samples’ reactivity to positive and negative stimuli, researchers typically find that young 
adults attend more to and remember negative stimuli (Compton, 2003). In the current 
study, younger adults embraced positive emotional captions but not negative after being 
primed with negativity. One possible explanation for this is that, when not conscious of a 
negative threat, negative stimuli encountered in one’s environment naturally trigger one’s 
emotion regulation system to seek positivity. Doing so would require some acceptance of 
positive feelings to offset any potential negativity. Just as older adults were less reactive 
to death primes than young adults, young adults appeared to be less strongly influenced 
by negative primes than older adults. This interpretation stems from the divergence in the 
patterns of response times exhibited by younger and older adults in the negative and 
death prime conditions. Interestingly, older adults in the negative prime condition not 
only embraced positive captions, but also embraced positivity more quickly than older 
adults in the death prime condition.  
Unconscious Primes Might Impact the Process of Defending 
It is possible that the subtle nature of the present death manipulation led to 
findings that differed from those noted in past work. In the past, researchers have induced 
mortality salience by explicitly asking participants to think about their own death and to 
write about what they think will happen when they die (e.g., DeWall & Baumeister, 
2007; Maxfield et al., 2007). Unlike much of the existing mortality salience literature, the 
current study attempted to induce mortality salience in an unconscious manner, such that 
participants remained unaware that they were being led to think about death. Therefore, 
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the subconscious induction to think about death may have led participants to avoid 
emotional extremes, and instead embrace the neutral captions. 
Outcomes from Maxfield et al. (2007) indicated that younger and older adults 
responded to mortality salience according to their age group, regardless of whether the 
mortality salience induction was subtle or not. In both mortality salience conditions, 
younger adults exhibited harsher judgments of moral transgressions, whereas older adults 
exhibited more lenient judgments. The authors attributed this age difference to a shift in 
the way individuals cope with the problem of death throughout the lifespan. Older adults, 
who are naturally closer to the end of life than are younger adults, have developed coping 
strategies that mirror their overall default goal pursuit: to increase positive emotionally 
meaningful experiences. Younger adults, on the other hand, did not attempt to increase 
positivity and instead coped with the threat of death by exhibiting the typical worldview 
defense and made harsher judgments for moral transgressions. Overall, Maxfield and 
colleagues’ findings were consistent with socioemotional selectivity theory. 
In the current study, younger adults exhibited a stronger defensive reaction in the 
death prime condition than in the negative prime condition, whereas older adults 
produced a stronger defensive reaction in the negative prime condition than in the death 
prime condition. More specifically, the specific defenses elicited from participants did 
not suggest automatic positive tuning, as has been demonstrated through the use of more 
conscious death primes (e.g., DeWall & Baumeister, 2007). Instead, the more 
unconscious priming methods appeared to yield an avoidance of negativity. This finding 
suggests that different types of priming (conscious or unconscious) may lead to the 
activation of different types of defenses. Whereas explicit mortality salience inductions 
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lead individuals to defend their worldview and attune to positive information, 
unconscious death primes appear to drive individuals to behave in a rational way and 
regulate their emotional reactions. After being unconsciously led to think about death, the 
focus for participants is to avoid negative information in the environment. 
Previous research on implicit goal priming indicates that these subtle-type 
manipulations unconsciously activate schemas, which lead participants to behave in ways 
that mirror the prime itself (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Hassin et al., 2009). However, 
research in the realm of terror management theory contends that thinking about death 
leads to specific behavioral defenses, which do not mirror the mortality salience 
induction. Instead, participants attempt to avert terror and reduce thoughts of death by 
focusing on positivity. As stated before, much of the support for terror management 
theory has arisen from literature that has used more explicit, or conscious methods of 
inducing mortality salience. Outcomes from the present study indicate that different and 
possibly more global behavioral defenses may spontaneously arise depending on whether 
mortality salience is induced via conscious or nonconscious methods. 
Early and Late Defenses? 
One important recent finding in the realm of terror management theory is the 
dual-process model. According to terror management theorists, two types of defenses 
occur in response to mortality salience: a proximal defense and a distal defense 
(Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Immediately after being primed with death, participants first 
attempt to reduce negative thoughts related to death. As the threat continues, the 
individual works to replace these negative thoughts with positive information, which 
involves emphasizing the meaningful place one holds in the world (Pyszczynski et al., 
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1999). In light of this finding, participants’ responses and reaction times were examined 
in the current study to see if they differed early on and later after being primed with 
death. Outcomes from this study suggest that proximal and distal defenses may not play a 
role when subtle death primes are utilized. Additional support for these findings was 
evidenced in other studies which subliminally primed participants with death. In these 
studies, participants displayed defenses immediately after the prime and these defenses 
were maintained throughout the entire experimental tasks (Arndt et al., 2001; 
Hirschberger et al., 2010). Therefore, as the threat of death forms over time, participants 
exhibit specific predictable behaviors early and late after being consciously primed with 
death. However, when unconscious, subtle primes are used, participants display 
homogenous emotion-regulatory mechanisms throughout the manipulation. 
Limitations 
 The current study has a number of limitations that temper the strength of the 
conclusions that can be drawn about the findings that have been reported. First, since 
participants in both conditions were primed with death or negativity, it is unclear what 
participants’ default responses to the picture caption task might look like. It is difficult to 
assume that participants, older adults especially, would not provide higher suitability 
ratings for the positive captions by default. In order to better draw conclusions regarding 
the effects of the primes, researchers should utilize a no-prime condition in future studies. 
Without this additional control condition, it is difficult to be completely certain that the 
two prime conditions produced the desired effects. 
 Another methodological limitation of this study was the absence of a 
manipulation check. Although word searches have been used as a priming tool in past 
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research (e.g., Hassin et al., 2009), they have never been used to induce mortality 
salience. Therefore, to ensure that the word searches produce the desired priming effects, 
some type of manipulation check, such as a memory test for the words, could be used in 
future studies in this area to ensure that the appropriate schema are being activated. 
Participants who more deeply process the prime words and are more engaged in the word 
search should be more strongly affected by the prime, and therefore should perform better 
on a subsequent memory test. 
 Unlike past research, the current study did not demonstrate positive tuning after 
being exposed to a death prime. Instead, participants provided higher suitability ratings 
for both neutral and positive captions after an unconscious mortality salience induction. 
Additionally, in the picture-caption manipulation check, participants rated neutral 
captions as being more pleasant than unpleasant. Therefore, the failure to find clear 
evidence of positive tuning may have resulted from the fact that participants viewed the 
neutral captions as being fairly pleasant instead of neutral. 
 Finally, it is important to note that many of the analyses in this study were 
underpowered. Many of the reported outcomes relied on within-subjects analyses because 
more participants were needed to conduct between-subjects tests that directly compare 
participants’ suitability ratings for each type of caption for each of the two prime 
conditions. In future studies of this type, researchers could avoid this limitation and 
increase statistical power by increasing the number of participants in each cell. 
Conclusion 
 Overall, the results were partly consistent with terror management theory, such 
that death appears to present a threat to individuals of all ages. Participants who were 
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primed with death did exhibit an avoidance of negative information. However, the 
unconscious nature of inducing mortality salience in the current study led to disparate 
findings as compared to previous research. Specifically, the expected type of emotional 
defense, or positive tuning, in the face of a death threat, did not emerge as a result of the 
subtle manipulation. Socioemotional selectivity theory, which posits that, younger and 
older adults pursue different types of goals based on their time perspective, was also 
partly supported. In the face of negative information, both younger and older adults 
embraced positivity, but the urgency in older adults’ responding was greater, confirming 
a possible greater inclination on the part of older adults to monitor the world for 
negativity so as to be prepared to avoid it. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
The End is Near 
E G L S R Z A F H Q V V O U S B E F Y J 
V R X U P E L O U H N H H C J A H R F D 
A J O G I N K E N O T S B M O T G A E G 
R W P A K R V A N O I T A M E R C A N M 
G A G H W J H C T M E M O R I A L I X A 
X K Y P R V M N Y R C P O X A O M V F U 
Y E W O N U C S I K E Y E E H L K U B S 
S W S C D W T H T Z W D V R A B N U H O 
A C X R Y R A U T I B O N B M E R C C L 
R L B A C D M O T A V Y M U R I P M U E 
Z L M S F R S Y A V R E Y A A S O B K U 
T R D L F T E T J F Q U L L M R N H Y M 
N I F F O C S L A R H Y A O G M A S H F 
E G M R C V R Q S T O Q R U E S K T W D 
U H K J X Y A T P P P T E P H U V Z Q F 
I V H Y A H E P G P I B B E V F L N B W
F I G V J E H D G C B R S G Y V X O G K 
Y R E T E M E C I K O H U J P C V T G Q 
K O V Y I P M A R A Z C A R W G E J H Y 
O P C F U D N E M A V I P F N B L U D T 
ASHES   BURIAL CEMETERY  COFFIN CREMATION 
EMBALMING  EULOGY FUNERAL  GRAVE  HEARSE 
MAUSOLEUM  MEMORIAL MORGUE  MORTICIAN OBITUARY 
SARCOPHAGUS TOMBSTONE UNDERTAKER  URN  WAKE 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Having a Bad Day 
D P I D D M K Z P K F C C D O O A W C B 
L E I W N I B E E R Q R E E A T O K P E 
E O P H Z U J N A J X N R B S Z Y N D T 
U R B R S X J U F O T J Z Y K X B B I R 
R S A D E D D E T N E M H S I N U P S A 
C M U P R S R H V E O U W L W Z F W L Y 
M R S X O Y S A Y Y L L G C T M L W O T 
W T X U R L S E H T P U R R O C I R Y L 
D P Z E U T L P D H U M I L I A T E A F 
F E S S R D O U S K E Q Q M U Z P W L Y 
O I T E A V P W T Q L M E D W U C E L C 
M V S A E C R Q Y E X G K J N T A M U I 
K S I R E K M F F I C O Y Q G W S I R S 
D K T N C F M F R N A A B C Y Q F W M W
G Y W I V T E H O S W Z C X W T N C S Q 
Y L I B J Z T D Y U K Y Y M I B Q I B S 
N M Z J Z N U O V L X A U M S W N P A U 
O P V I T K L R I T V A O P Q B H G Y P 
G T O J U X I W E A F V T E Q Y Z M A B 
A F A I L U R E Z R C D E I R B T P V V 
AGONY  BETRAY  CORRUPT CRUEL  DEFEATED 
DEPRESSED  DISLOYAL  FAILURE FRAUD  HARDSHIP 
HUMILIATE  INSULT  MISERY PAIN  POLLUTE 
POVERTY  PUNISHMENT  SAD  STRESS VOMIT 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Birds of a Feather 
C A R D I N A L O R K O E U V N L N W K 
H N N D K J R W A R M P C N O I O R O F 
M A N A D T H K Q O I Z P Y A C W X R E 
E V O D N M H U C P U O H F L R Y N C U 
L W Y T T J T K M Z L L L A E V C U Z B 
I W W H W S I S S M R H F E K V E L D L 
A G T W E N J E A T I X A N G P H S Z U 
U C U T G H A W K X Q N Q C N F X I Q M 
Q G A B T A P O R X A B G C B P Q O B N 
D S I B L U E B I R D H T B I J K N A Q 
C R R O B I N D U C K B F G I W Y C M I 
D P Y B C C E D T T N T E M G R I N Q I 
H V L U L K O S A M C O E S K L D W Y Q 
L L K A G R W P F N N L M P E H D M O T 
Y L M V M A L A Y F G G N P E P X L Y B 
U M I R Y L Z R E A R W Z L Y J Y S Y W
B K U X N L Q R E U A C U I L T B A B E 
H D M U E L D O L J R F D V W H I I J T 
E K O E H I L T Z O K T P I R G H U S E 
F I N C H A Q O Y W U G K B V I U H E O 
BLUEBIRD  CARDINAL CRANE   CROW  DOVE 
DUCK   EAGLE  FALCON  FINCH  HAWK 
HUMMINGBIRD LARK  MOCKINGBIRD ORIOLE OWL 
PARROT  PELICAN PIGEON  QUAIL  ROBIN 
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APPENDIX M 
 
Participant Pleasant/Unpleasant Ratings for Photographs in the Picture-Caption Task 
Manipulation Check 
 
Photograph Type Pleasant Rating Unpleasant Rating 
Positive 4.1 (0.6) 1.3 (0.5) 
Negative 1.2 (0.3) 4.3 (0.8) 
Neutral 2.4 (0.6) 2.1 (0.6) 
 
Note. The picture-caption task manipulation check included the 24 neutral photographs 
from the IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and Google Images. This task also 
included 24 emotional (12 negative and 12 positive) images from the IAPS that were not 
included in the picture-caption task. Participants provided two separate ratings for each 
photograph (pleasant and unpleasant) on a scale of 1 (not at all pleasant/unpleasant) to 5 
(completely pleasant/unpleasant) 
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APPENDIX N 
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Personality and Cognitive Measures for Older and 
Younger Adults 
 
Measure Older Adults Younger Adults 
Vocabulary Test 9.2 (3.3) 7.2 (2.3) 
Letter Sets Test 8.0 (3.3) 10.2 (3.0) 
Trail Making Test 63.4 s (41.2) 33.9 s (21.2) 
Time Scale 4.4 (1.1) 5.7 (0.8) 
PANAS Positive Affect 3.6 (0.7) 3.0 (0.6) 
PANAS Negative Affect 1.3 (0.3) 1.6 (0.5) 
LOT Optimism 2.9 (0.6) 2.6 (0.7) 
LOT Pessimism 1.2 (0.7) 1.8 (0.7) 
Religiosity 4.0 (1.0) 3.6 (1.0) 
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APPENDIX O 
 
Means and Standard Errors Depicted in Figures 1 through 4 
 
Condition Caption Type Suitability Rating Standard Error 
Negative Negative 3.13 0.11 
 Neutral 3.26 0.10 
 Positive 3.39 0.11 
Death Negative 2.92 0.12 
 Neutral 3.27 0.10 
 Positive 3.18 0.12 
 
Caption Type Age Group Condition Reaction Time (in msec) 
Standard Error 
(in msec) 
Negative Young Negative 7299 563 
  Death 6428 592 
 Old Negative 11203 615 
  Death 12089 615 
 
Caption Type Age Group Condition Reaction Time (in msec) 
Standard Error 
(in msec) 
Positive Young Negative 6739 587 
  Death 6177 618 
 Old Negative 10310 641 
  Death 11590 641 
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Caption Type Age Group Condition Reaction Time (in msec) 
Standard Error 
(in msec) 
Neutral Young Negative 6878 458 
  Death 6346 482 
 Old Negative 11728 501 
  Death 11686 501 
 
 
